Spatial models of logrolling in the European Union. by Crombez, Christophe
DEPARTEMENT TOEGEPASTE 
ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9823 




Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Naamsestraat 69,  8-3000  Leuven ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT  NR 9823 




0/1998/2376/23 Spatial Models of 
Logrolling 




This paper presents spatial models of logrolling in the EU.  It analyzes the 
Commission appointment, logrolling and policy making processes under the 
EU's  principal  legislative  procedures:  the  consultation,  cooperation  and 
codecision procedures. The theory characterizes equilibrium EU policies and 
sets of  successful  policies,  i.e.,  sets  of  policies  that can become EU  policy 
during the logrolling and policy making processes.  It determines countries' 
optimal nomination strategies and countries and legislators' optimal voting 
strategies during the Commission appointment process.  Journal  of Economic 
Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72. Keywords: Logrolling; European 
Union, Policy Making. 
* University of Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Phone:+32-
16-3269 05. Fax: +32-16-326732. E-Mail: 
christophe.crombez@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
1 1 Introduction 
European Union (EU)  policy makers may have other policy issues in mind 
when setting EU policy on a particular issue. Consideration of multiple issues 
may motivate exchanges of votes among policy makers. Policy makers may 
support a policy change on a certain issue even though they prefer the status 
quo, in exchange for other legislators' support for policy changes on other 
issues. Divergent policy preferences create opportunities for such vote trading 
or logrolling. 
The EU legislative process has received widespread attention in recent years. 
The  literature  includes  theoretical  analyses  of  the  legislative  procedures, 
amongst others by Steunenberg (1994),  Tsebelis (1994),  and Crombez (1996, 
1997a).  In these models the Commission, the Parliament and the countries 
consider specific policy issues and do not engage in logrolling. Equilibrium 
EU policies depend on the preferences of the Commission, the Parliament and 
the countries, and these preferences are assumed to be exogenous. 
Crombez  (1997b) endogenizes the Commission's preferences by studying the 
Commission  appointment  process.  He  characterizes  sets  of  effective 
Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully 
propose their own ideal policies,  as functions  of the  ideal policies  of the 
countries and the Parliament. 
It is  somewhat  surprising that  theoretical  analyses  of  the  EU  legislative 
process have largely neglected logrolling so far,  as the political economics 
literature includes a considerable number of theoretical analyses of logrolling. 
Tullock  (1959)  provides  an  early  analysis  of  logrolling.  He  argues  that 
logrolling leads to socially inefficient policies, and finds that logrolls are less 
efficient the smaller the majority required. He also points at the instability of 
logrolls. 
2 Subsequent contributions focus on specific aspects of logrolling, including the 
points raised by Tullock. Downs (1961)  does not consider socially inefficient 
logrolling  as  a  consequence  of  majority  rule.  He  claims  that  legislators' 
electoral motivations and the electorate's consideration of over-all legislative 
programs rather than isolated policy issues would prevent logrolling, if it 
were not for the electorate's ignorance. Buchanan and Tullock (1962)  show 
that vote trading may indeed be socially efficient.1 In the models introduced 
in  this  paper  logrolls  are  efficient.  All  countries  need  to  approve  the 
appointment of a  Commission. They consider policies when voting on the 
Commission. A Commission is then appointed only if all countries prefer the 
resulting policy or logroll to the status quo. Implemented logrolls are thus 
socially efficient. 
Bernholz (1973) shows that in "two issues, two alternatives" cases logrolling is 
possible if majorities of two thirds or less are required for decisions. Koford 
(1982) claims that u.s. legislative institutions help establish stable and efficient 
forms of vote trading.2 Baron (1991) presents sequential games of distributive 
politics.  Using  noncooperative  game  theory  he  studies  what  distributive 
programs  legislatures  adopt  under  perfect  information.  He  shows  that 
majoritarian  incentives  can lead  to  the  adoption  of  inefficient  programs, 
legislatures can limit the inefficiency through the choice of procedures, and 
adopted programs are stable. In this paper the EU institutions lead to stable 
logrolls. 
As mentioned above, logrolling in the EU has received little attention in the 
literature so far.  Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994)  discuss theories of 
logrolling and apply them to the EU in an institution-free setting. Carrubba 
and Volden (1996) present a distributive model of logrolling. They study how 
chamber  size  and  voting  rule  affect  a  legislature'S  ability  to  engage  in 
logrolling, and refer to the EU as an example. 
3 This paper presents spatial models of logrolling in the ED.  Alternative ED 
policies are represented by points in a policy space and policy makers are 
assumed  to  have  preferences  over  these  points.  Most  other  models  of 
logrolling  are  distributive,  i.e.,  different  policies  correspond  to  different 
amounts of government spending and to different budget allocations. Tullock 
(1970)  provides an exception in this respect. He presents a spatial model of 
logrolling thus integrating the literatures on logrolling and spatial models. He 
concludes that differences in voters' intensities of preferences on certain issues 
create opportunities for logrolling. I find opportunities for logrolling in the 
absence of different intensities of preferences. 
I  introduce sequential, finite  horizon games  of ED  logrolling in a  spatial 
context.  The countries,  Members of the  European Parliament (MEPs)  and 
Commissioners have complete and perfect information.3  The models yield 
equilibrium policies as functions of the countries' and MEPs' preferences. In 
the models the ED member countries, as represented in the Council, and the 
MEPs first appoint a Commission. The countries and MEPs are assumed to 
have preferences over ED  policies.  They care about the Commission only 
because it affects  ED  policy.  Therefore,  they think ahead and look at the 
logrolling and policy making processes when they appoint a  Commission. 
Subsequently, the countries, MEPs and Commissioners can approve a broad 
ED legislative program, which provides opportunities for logrolling. If they 
fail to agree on a logroll, the countries, MEPs and Commissioners finally set 
ED policy on each issue separately. 
In the next section I introduce the models. I present a model for each of the 
ED's three principal legislative procedures: the consultation, cooperation and 
codecision  procedures.4  The  third  section  considers  policy  making  on 
individual policy issues and characterizes equilibrium ED policies and sets of 
successful policies during policy making, i.e., sets of policies that can become 
4 EU policy during the policy making process. These sets and the equilibrium 
EU policies are functions  of the ideal policies of  the countries, MEPs and 
Commissioners, and the location of the status quo.  In the fourth section I 
consider  logrolling,  and  characterize  equilibrium EU  policies  and  sets  of 
successful policies during logrolling, i.e., sets of policies that can become EU 
policy during the logrolling process. Again, the sets and equilibrium policies 
are functions of the ideal policies of the countries, MEPs and Commissioners, 
and the location of  the  status  quo.  The  fifth  section  studies  Commission 
appointment  and  characterizes  the  countries'  equilibrium  nomination 
strategies and the countries' and MEPs' equilibrium voting strategies during 
the  Commission  appointment  process.  The  sixth  section  presents  the 
conclusions. 
I  find  that  under  consultation  the  Commission  President  successfully 
proposes as a logroll the policy it prefers most among the policies a qualified 
majority in the Council and a majority of the Commissioners prefer to the 
policy that results in the policy making process. Under cooperation a majority 
of the MEPs also needs to  prefer the equilibrium logroll to the policy that 
results in the  policy making process.  Under codecision the countries and 
MEPs  may  amend  the  logroll  the  Commission  President  proposes  in 
equilibrium. 
2 The Model 
I present spatial models of Commission appointment, logrolling and policy 
making in the EU. Alternative logrolls and policies are represented by points 
in an n-dimensional policy space. Each dimension corresponds to a specific 
policy  issue, such as  the allowable noncocoa fat  level  in chocolate or the 
length of daylight saving time.  Logrolling and policy making can then be 
thought of as choosing a point in the policy space. 
5 I  assume  that  countries  have  Euclidean  preferences  over  the  EU  policy 
p(pl , ... ,pn), with ideal policy  Pk(P/ '''',Pt'')  for country k.  Each country 
has an ideal policy and prefers policies that are closer to, rather than farther 
away from, its ideal policy. I refer to the EU policy pi on dimension i as the i-
policy, and to country k's ideal policy p/ on dimension i as country k's ideal 
i-policy.S  MEPs  and  potential  Commissioners  are  also  assumed  to  have 
Euclidean preferences over the EU policy. 
I  study  the  EU's  three  principal  legislative  procedures:  the  consultation, 
cooperation  and  codecision  procedures,  and  present  a  model  for  each 
procedure.  Each model consists  of  three  sequential games:  a  Commission 
appointment game, a logrolling game and a policy game. First, the countries 
and MEPs appoint a Commission. Subsequently, the Commissioners, MEPs 
and countries can engage in logrolling, i.e., they have an opportunity to trade 
votes across  policy issues. If the logrolling efforts fail,  they finally  set EU 
policies  on  the  n  dimensions  separately.  I  now  study  the  Commission 
appointment, logrolling and policy games in more detail. 
2.1 Commission Appointment 
The Commission appointment process, as studied in the model, is shown in 
Figure 1. It is analyzed in more detail by Crombez (1997b).  In the first stage 
Nature selects  the  country' k  that is  to  propose a  Comm.ission  President. 
Country k's selection probability could, for example, be equal to its share of 
the  Commissioners.6  Subsequently,  country  k  proposes  a  Commission 
President.  Next,  the  countries  simultaneously  propose  the  other 
Commissioners. In the fourth and fifth stages the countries and the Parliament 
vote on the proposed Commission. If all countries and a majority of MEPs 
vote in favor, the proposed Commission is appointed? Otherwise, the status 
quo prevails.s The status quo is either the policy agreed on under a previous 
6 Commission, or the result of existing national policies. On the daylight saving 
time issue, for example, the status quo would be daylight saving time from 
the last weekend of March until the last weekend of October. On the chocolate 
issue, the status quo would be the absence of an internal market. 
---Figure 1 about here---
2.2 Logrolling 
The logrolling process, as studied in the model, is shown in Figure 2.9  First, 
the  Commission  President  proposes  a  logroll.  Subsequently,  the 
Commissioners vote on the proposed logroll. If the proposed logroll obtains 
the support of a  simple majority  of the  Commissioners,  it  is  sent to the 
Parliament and the Council. If  the proposed logroll fails to obtain the support 
of a majority of the Commissioners, the Commission proposes the countries 
and MEPs that no logroll be implemented. 
---Figure 2 about here---
Under the codecision procedure the MEPs and the countries, as represented in 
the  Council,  can  together  approve  an  amendment  to  the  proposal.10  In 
particular,  the Council President can propose an amendment in the third 
stage  of  the  logrolling  process.  If the  Parliament  President approves  the 
amendment in the fourth stage, it is subsequently voted on in the Council and 
the Parliament. The amendment needs the support of a qualified majority in 
the Council and a majority of MEPs for approval. A qualified majority in the 
Council consists of 62  out of a  total of 87 votes.11  The countries and MEPs 
compare the amendment to  the logroll.  Finally,  the winner of this vote is 
voted on by the countries and MEPs in the seventh and eighth stages of the 
logrolling process. The countries and MEPs compare the (amended) logroll to 
7 the policy that is implemented if no logroll is agreed on. To be adopted the 
(amended) logroll needs the support of a  qualified majority in the Council 
and a  majority of the MEPs.  If no logroll  is  adopted,  the  policy  making 
process commences. 
Under consultation and cooperation no amendments are voted on.  Under 
cooperation the countries and MEPs vote on the logroll, as under codecision, 
whereas under consultation only the countries vote on the logroll. 
2.3 Policy Making 
If  no logroll is agreed on, the countries and institutions turn their attention to 
policy making and deal with the n policy issues one issue at a time. Since the 
countries, the MEPs and the Commissioners have Euclidean preferences, their 
preferences over the i-policy are independent of the EU  policies on other 
dimensions. Country k's utility, for example, decreases as the i-policy moves 
farther away from country k's ideal i-policy p/, whatever the EU policies on 
the other dimensions are. Policy making on dimension i can thus be studied as 
if it were the only relevant dimension. 
The Commission and the Parliament use majority rule,  and there  are no 
restrictions on amendments. As a consequence, the analysis of policy making 
on dimension i can be simplified by focusing on the ideal i-policies of the i-
median Commissioner and the i-median MEP. Suppose the i-status quo qi  is 
to the right (left)  of the i-median Commissioner  IS  ideal i-policy  Pc i •  The i-
median Commissioner and all Commissioners on his left (right) then want a 
move to the left (right). As a result, any i-policy is defeated in the Commission 
by i-policies  that are closer to the i-median Commissioner's ideal  i-policy. 
Similar reasoning applies to voting in the Parliament. With respect to policy 
making on dimension i  the  Commission and the  Parliament can thus  be 
8 treated as unitary actors with ideal i-policies equal to their i-median voters' 
ideal policies, p/ and p/ respectively.12 
The Council is not represented as a  unitary actor because it uses qualified 
majority rule. Nonetheless, the analysis of policy making on dimension i can 
be  simplified  by  focusing  on  the  countries  that  are  i-pivotal  under  the 
qualified majority rule. The country ai  that is i-pivotal for a move to the right 
thus has an ideal policy to the left of the country with the i-median vote. In 
particular,  country  ai  is  the  country with  the  26th  vote  (from  the  left). 
Country ai  and the countries to its right then have 62 votes, and the countries 
to its right do not constitute a  qualified majority without country  ai •  The 
country bi  that is i-pivotal for a move to the left is the country with the 62nd 
vote. 
Policy making on dimension i  starts with a proposal from the Commission. 
The  Commission  proposal  goes  through  one  of  the  EU's  legislative 
procedures.  The  model  focuses  on  the  consultation,  cooperation  and 
codecision procedures. Crombez (1996)  presents a model of the consultation 
and cooperation procedures,  and Crombez  (1997a)  studies  the  codecision 
procedure. This model uses simplified versions of  those models. They are 
shown in Figure 3. 
----- Figure 3 about here-----
First, the Commission proposes a policy. Under the codecision procedure the 
Parliament can then offer a joint text, which becomes EU policy if a qualified 
majority in the Council approves it.l3  If the Parliament does not propose a 
joint text or the Council  rejects  it,  the countries  vote on the Commission 
proposal in the fourth stage. If a qualified majority accepts the proposal and 
the Parliament approves it under the cooperation and codecision procedures, 
then the proposal becomes EU policy. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
9 The models incorporate complete and perfect ifliormation. The countries, the 
MEPs and the Commissioners know each other's preferences, the location of 
the status quo, the impact of proposed policies, the sequential structure of the 
models, and the actions taken in prior stages of the models. They know which 
issues they will be addressing during the Commission's term.14 
An  equilibrium  consists  of  a  strategy  for  each  country,  MEP  and 
Commissioner. Strategies tell the countries, the MEPs and the Commissioners 
what actions  to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the 
actions  taken in prior stages. The equilibrium concept is  subgame perfect 
Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no country, MEP or Commissioner can achieve a 
higher utility by choosing another strategy, given the other countries', MEPs' 
and  Commissioners'  strategies.  In  a  subgame  perfect  Nash  equilibrium, 
countries and institutions can do no better than stick to their strategies in any 
stage of the procedure, even if a  country, MEP or Commissioner deviated 
from the equilibrium strategy in a prior stage. 
3 The Policy Making Process 
In  this  section  I  study the  policy  game.  This  game  is  played  when  the 
Commission has been appointed and attempts at logrolling have failed. In the 
game the Commission proposes ED  policies for the n  policy issues.  The n 
policy issues are dealt with one at a time. The Commission first proposes an 
ED  policy for issue 1. The countries and the Parliament then consider the 
proposal under the consultation, cooperation or codecision procedure. The 
procedure ends with the adoption, amendment or rejection of the proposal. 
When the procedure is over, the Commission proposes a policy on issue 2, 
and the countries and the Parliament consider the proposal under one of the 
three procedures. This sequence is repeated until all n issues have been dealt 
with. I look at three scenarios: in the first scenario all issues are dealt with 
10 under the consultation procedure, in the  second scenario  the cooperation 
procedure  applies  to  all  issues,  and  in  the  third  scenario  all  issues  are 
considered under the codecision procedure. 
For each procedure I first look at policy making on a single dimension i.  As 
mentioned above, policy making on dimension i can be studied as if it were 
the only relevant dimension. I go through the different steps of the procedure, 
and determine the set of successful i-policies and the equilibrium i-policy. 
Subsequently, I look at the entire policy space and characterize the set of 
successful policies and the equilibrium ED policy in the n-dimensional policy 
space, for any configuration of ideal policies and for any location of the status 
quo. 
3.1 Policy Making under Consultation 
The Commission starts policy making on dimension i  by proposing an i-
policy pi, as shown in Figure 3. It wants the i-policy to be as close to its ideal 
i-policy as possible.15  This does not imply, however, that the Commission 
proposes its ideal i-policy. The Commission understands the role the Council 
plays in the next stage of the procedure and takes this into account when it 
makes its proposal. 
In the second stage the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the 
Council.  They  compare  it  to  the  i-status  quo.  A  qualified  majority  then 
approves the Commission proposal if it prefers the proposal to the i-status 
quo. The set CSi  of successful i-policies under the consultation procedure, i.e., 
the set of i-policies that the Commission can successfully propose, is thus the 
set of i-policies that are preferred to the i-status quo by a qualified majority in 
the Council. In the first stage the Commission successfully proposes the i-
policy Pc/ that belongs to the set CSi  and is closest to its ideal i-policy. The i-
11 policy  Pe/  is  approved  by  a  qualified  majority  in the  Council  and thus 
becomes the equilibrium i-policy. 
To illustrate policy making on dimension i I use the configuration of ideal i-
policies shown in Figure 4. Country ai, the Parliament and the Commission, 
with ideal i-policies Pa i ,  ppi  and p/  respectively, have ideal i-policies to the 
right of the i-status quo. For simplicity, the i-status quo qi  is assumed to be 
equal to zero. The Parliament has an ideal i-policy to the left of countries ai 
and  bi  that  are  pivotal  under  the  qualified  majority  rule,  whereas  the 
Commission is located more to the right. In Figure 4 country a i  and thus a 
qualified  majority  prefer  a  move to  the right.  The  set  CSi  of successful 
policies is then the set of i-policies country ai  prefers to the i-status quo. This 
set contains all i-policies that are closer to country ai,s ideal i-policy than is 
the status quo. The equilibrium i-policy is the Commission's ideal i-policy, i.e., 
i  .....  i 
Pes  = Pc  . 
----- Figure 4 about here-----
The n i-proposals that the Commission makes during the policy game can be 
thought of as constituting a proposal in the n-dimensional policy space. Such 
a proposal is then successful if each of its i-proposals is successful. Proposition 
1 characterizes the set of successful policies during policy making and the 
equilibrium policy under consultation. 
Proposition 1  The  set  CS  of successful  policies  during  policy  making  under 
consultation is the set of  policies such that each i-policy is preferred to the i-status quo 
by  a qualified  majority  in  the  Council,  i.e.,  CS={p(P', ... ,plI)S.t.pi  ECSi,Vi  }. 
During the  policy  making process  the  Commission  successfully proposes  the  policy 
Pes  that belongs to the set  CS and is closest to its ideal policy.16 
12 Figure 5 shows the set CS for a particular configuration of ideal policies in a 
two-dimensional policy space.  In Figure 5  the two policies that the ED  is 
addressing  during  the  Commission's  term  are  (1)  market  liberalization 
(economic policy) and (2)  cohesion (social  policy).  The ideal policies of the 
countries  and  the  Parliament  were  chosen  for  illustrative  purposes  but 
correspond to reality. The "southern" countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy 
and Portugal) want to move far on cohesion, but want little change on market 
liberalization.  They  have  a  total  of  31  votes  in the  Council.  The  United 
Kingdom, with 10 votes, wants a lot more liberalization, but little change on 
cohesion. The Ilcore"  countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands  and  Austria),  as  well  as  the  "northern"  countries  (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) have intermediate positions on both issues. They have 
36 and 10  votes respectively.  The Parliament's ideal policy is  between the 
ideal policies of the core and the southern countries. The southern countries 
are pivotal on market liberalization, whereas the core countries are pivotal on 
cohesion. The set CS is then the set of policies that are preferred to the status 
quo on market liberalization by the southern countries and on cohesion by the 
core countries. 
-----Figure 5 about here-----
Suppose the Commission's ideal policy is  equal to the core countries' ideal 
policy in Figure 5.  The Commission can then successfully propose its ideal 
policy  on cohesion,  since  the  core countries  are  pivotal  on cohesion.  The 
Commission  cannot  successfully  propose  its  ideal  policy  on  market 
liberalization  however.  The  southern  countries  are  pivotal  on  market 
liberalization and they prefer the status quo to the Commission's ideal policy. 
On liberalization the Commission then proposes the policy  2Pa 1  that makes 
the  southern  countries  indifferent  to  the  status  quo.  In  Figure  5  the 
Commission  thus  successfull  y  proposes  the  policy  Pes  (2 Pal, P  a  2).  Any 
13 Commission with an ideal  policy  on the  dotted  line  would  successfully 
propose the same policy. 
3.2 Policy Making under Cooperation 
Under cooperation the Commission proposes a policy, which is subsequently 
voted on by  the countries  and the Parliament,  as  shown in Figure  3.  A 
qualified majority and the Parliament approve the proposal if they prefer it to 
the status quo. The set  Cpi  of successful  i-policies  under the cooperation 
procedure is thus the set of i-policies that are preferred to the i-status quo by a 
qualified majority in the Council and by the Parliament. The set Cpi is thus a 
subset of the set CSi  of successful policies under the consultation procedure. 
The Commission successfully proposes the i-policy Pc/  that belongs to the set 
Cpi and is closest to its ideal i-policy. 
In Figure 4  the  pivotal country  ai  prefers an i-policy  to the right of the 
Parliament's ideal i-policy. It wants to move further away from the i-status 
quo than does the Parliament. If the Parliament approves the Commission 
proposal, a qualified majority in the Council thus supports it as well. The set 
Cpi of successful i-policies is then the set of proposals the Parliament prefers 
to the i-status quo. The equilibrium i-policy is the policy  2 p  / that makes the 
Parliament indifferent to the status quo. 
Proposition 2 characterizes the set of successful policies during policy making 
and the equilibrium policy under cooperation. 
Proposition  2  The  set  CP  of successful  policies  during  policy  making  under 
cooperation is the set of  policies such that each i-policy is preferred to  the i-status quo 
by  a  qualified  majority  in  the  Council  and  by  the  Parliament,  i.e., 
CP =  {p(p I,. .. ,  p n )s.t. pi  ECP; ,\;f  i  }.  The  set  CP  is  a  subset  of the  set  CS  of 
14 successful  policies  under  consultation.  The  Parliament's  greater  role  under 
cooperation thus reduces the set of  successful policies during policy making. During 
the  policy  making  process  the  Commission  successfully  proposes  the  policy  that 
belongs to the set CP and is closest to its ideal poliClJ. 
In Figure 5  the set CP  of successful  policies  during policy making under 
cooperation is equal to the set CS  of successful policies during policy making 
under consultation, because the Parliament wants to move further away from 
the status quo than do the pivotal countries  a 1 and  a 2 on both dimensions. 
The Commission thus proposes the same policy as under the consultation 
procedure in Figure 5. 
3.3 Policy Making under Codecision 
The last two stages of the codecision procedure, as shown in Figure 3,  are 
reached if the Parliament and the Council fail to agree on an i-joint text. They 
are  the  same  as  the  last  two  stages  of  the  cooperation  procedure:  the 
Parliament and the Council vote on the i-proposal. For approval the proposal 
thus needs to be preferred to the i-status quo by a qualified majority in the 
Council and by the Parliament. It needs to belong to the set Cpi of successful 
i-policies under cooperation. 
An i-proposal that belongs to the set Cpi does not necessarily reach the last 
two stages of  the codecision procedure, however. In the second stage the 
Parliament can propose an i-joint text, and this i-joint text becomes the i-policy 
if a qualified majority approves it in the third stage. Since the countries think 
ahead, they compare the i-joint text to the i-proposal in the third stage. The i-
joint text is then adopted if a qualified majority prefers it to the i-proposal. 
The Parliament can thus successfully  propose an i-joint  text in the second 
stage if  there are i-policies a qualified majority prefers to  the proposal. The 
15 Parliament uses this opportunity if it prefers such i-policies to the i-proposal. 
As a result, the i-proposal does not reach the last two stages of the procedure 
if there are i-policies the Parliament and a qualified majority prefer to it. The 
set  CDi  of successful i-policies under codecision is thus the set of i-policies 
that satisfy the following requirements: (1)  they are preferred to the i-status 
quo by the Parliament and a qualified majority, and (2) no i-policy is preferred 
to them by the Parliament and a  qualified majority. The set  CDi  is  thus a 
subset of the set Cpi of successful policies under cooperation. In the first stage 
the Commission successfully proposes the i-policy Pc/  that belongs to the set 
CDi  and is closest to its ideal i-policy. 
In Figure  4  the  Parliament  successfully  proposes  an i-joint  text  if  the  i-
proposal is to the left of its ideal i-policy. The Parliament, country ai  and thus 
a qualified majority then prefer an i-policy to the right of the i-proposal. If  the 
i-proposal is to the right of country  bi IS  ideal i-policy, the Parliament also 
successfully proposes an i-joint text. The Parliament, country  bi  and thus a 
qualified majority then prefer an i-policy to the left of the i-proposal. If the i-
proposal is between the ideal i-policies of the Parliament and country ai, the 
Parliament cannot successfully propose an i-joint text. The Parliament prefers 
i-policies  to  the left of the i-proposal, whereas a  qualified majority in the 
Council prefers i-policies to the right. If the i-proposal is between the ideal i-
policies of countries ai  and bi , the Parliament cannot successfully propose an 
i-joint text either, since the Council cannot agree on a  policy change by a 
qualified majority. In Figure 4 the set CDi  of successful i-policies is thus the 
set of i-policies between the ideal i-policies of the Parliament and country bi • 
The  Commission  successfully  proposes  country  bls  ideal  i-policy,  i.e., 
Pc/  = Pb i .  The equilibrium i-policy Pc/  under codecision is farther from the 
Commission's  ideal  i-policy  than  is  the  equilibrium  i-policy  Pcp  i  under 
cooperation, because the Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council 
prefer a policy left of the i-policy  Pcp i • 
16 Proposition 3 characterizes the set of successful policies during policy making 
and the equilibrium policy under codecision. 
Proposition  3  The  set  CD  of successful  policies  during  policy  making  under 
codecision  is  the  set  of policies  such  that  each  i-policy  satisfies  the  following 
requirements: (1) it is preferred to  the i-status quo by the Parliament and a qualified 
majority,  and  (2)  no  i-policy is  preferred  to  it by the  Parliament and a  qualified 
majority, i.e.,  CD = {p(pl,. .. , p" )S.t.pi ECDi  ,Vi}. The set CD is a subset of the  set 
CP of  successful policies during policy making under cooperation.  The  Parliament's 
greater role under codecision thus further reduces the set of  successful policies during 
policy  making.  During  the  policy  making  process  the  Commission  successfully 
proposes the policy  Pcd  that belongs to the set CD and is closest to its ideal policy. 
In  Figure  5  proposals  left  of  the  southern  countries'  ideal  policy  are 
unsuccessful,  because  the  Parliament  and  the  pivotal  southern  countries 
prefer to move farther on market liberalization. The Parliament would thus 
successfully propose a joint text on market liberalization. Similarly, proposals 
under  the  core  countries'  ideal  policy  are  unsuccessful,  because  the 
Parliament and the pivotal core countries want to move farther on cohesion. 
Proposals right of the policy  2  Pal  that makes the pivotal southern countries 
indifferent to the status quo on market liberalization are unsuccessful, because 
the soqthern countries and thus a  qualified majority prefer the status quo. 
Similarly,  proposals  above  the  policy  2Pa 2  that  makes  the  pivotal  core 
countries indifferent to the status quo on cohesion are unsuccessful, because 
the core countries and thus a  qualified majority prefer the status quo. The 
other policies satisfy the above conditions and thus constitute the set CD. The 
Commission  successfully  proposes  the  policy  Any 
Commission with an ideal  policy  in  the  shaded  area  would  successfully 
propose the same policy. 
17 4 The Logrolling Process 
In  this  section  I  discuss  the  countries'  ,  MEPs'  and  Commissioners' 
opportunities  for  logrolling.  The  logrolling  game  is  played  after  the 
appointment of a Commission and before the setting of EU policies on the n 
dimensions.  I  consider  three  scenarios:  logrolling  under  consultation, 
cooperation and codecision. 
4.1 Logrolling under Consultation 
Under consultation the Commission President first  proposes a  logroll,  as 
shown in Figure 2.  Next,  the Commissioners  vote  on it,  and  finally  the 
countries consider it in the Council.  The  proposed logron is  adopted if a 
majority  of  the  Commissioners  and  a  qualified  majority  in  the  Council 
approve  it.  The  Commissioners and the  countries compare the  proposed 
logron to the policy  Pes  that becomes EU policy if no logron is adopted. The 
logron is then adopted if a majority of the Commissioners and a  qualified 
majority in the Council prefer it to the policy Pes' 
Let the sets Q(p)  and C(p)  be the sets of policies that are preferred to the 
policy  p by a  qualified  majority and by a  majority  of the Commissioners 
respectively. Proposition 4 characterizes the set of successful policies durLng 
logrolling and the equilibrium logron under consultation. 
Proposition 4 The set  Les  of  successful policies under logrolling under consultation 
is the set of  policies that are preferred to  the policy  Pes  by a qualified majority in the 
Council  and  by a majority of the  Commissioners,  i.e.,  Les  =  Q(p  es) n C(p  es)'  The 
Commission President successfully proposes as a logroll the policy that belongs to the 
set  Les  and is closest to his ideal policy. 
18 Figure 6 reproduces part of Figure 5.  It focuses on the ideal policies of the 
southern and core countries, and shows the sets of successful policies during 
logrolling under the three legislative procedures. The Parliament is no longer 
represented as a  unitary actor, as  logrolls concern multiple dimensions. In 
practice,  for  a  logroll  to  receive  the  support of  a  majority  of  MEPs,  the 
approval of the two main political groups in the Parliament is needed. These 
groups  are  the  group  of the  Party  of  European Socialists  (PES)  and  the 
conservative European People's Party (EPP)P In Figure 6 I consider these two 
groups as unitary actors, as they tend to be cohesive. 
---Figure 6 about here---
In Figure 6 the core countries as well as the southern countries represent a 
blocking minority in the Council, i.e., without them no qualified majority can 
be  formed.  Together  the  core  and  southern  countries  form  a  qualified 
majority. As a result the set Q(PcJ of policies that are preferred to the policy 
P  cs  by a qualified majority is the set of policies that are preferred to the policy 
P  cs  by the southern and core countries. It consists of the shaded areas in 
Figure 6.  Suppose each country appoints Commissioners with ideal policies 
equal to its own. Then the policies in the set Q(p  es)  are also preferred to the 
policy Pes  by a majority of the Commissioners, because the southern and core 
countries together appoint 15 Commissioners out of 21. As a result the set Les 
of successful policies during logrolling under consultation is the set Q(p  es)  of 
policies that are preferred to  the  policy  Pes  by a  qualified majority in the 
Council. Suppose the Commission President's ideal policy is equal to the core 
countries' ideal policy. Then the Commission President successfully proposes 
as a logroll the policy  Ics  that belongs to the set Les  and is closest to his ideal 
policy. 
19 4.2 Logrolling under Cooperation 
Under cooperation the MEPs  vote on the logroll  in the  last stage  of the 
logrolling process, as shown in Figure 2.  The prior stages of the logrolling 
process are as under consultation.  A  logroll thus needs the approval of a 
majority of the MEPs to be adopted, in addition to the approval of a majority 
of the Commissioners and a qualified majority in the Council. Let the set pep) 
be the set of policies that are preferred to the policy p by a majority of MEPs. 
Proposition 5 characterizes the set of successful policies during logrolling and 
the equilibrium logroll under cooperation. 
Proposition 5 The set  Lep  of  successful policies during logrolling under cooperation 
is  the  set  of policies  that  are  preferred  to  the  policy  Pep  by  a majority  of the 
Commissioners,  a qualified majority in  the  Council,  and a majority of MEPs,  i.e., 
Lep  = pep  ep) n Q(p  ep) n C(p  ep)' The Commission President successfully proposes as 
a logroll the policy that belongs to the set  Lep  and is closest to his ideal policy. 
In Figure 6 the policy Pep  is equal to the policy Pes' As a result, the set Lep  of 
successful policies during logrolling under cooperation is a subset of the set 
Les  of successful policies during logrolling under consultation. For a logroll to 
receive the support of a majority of the MEPs it needs to be preferred to the 
policy  Pep  by the PES and EPP groups. In Figure 6 the set Lep  is bounded by 
the indifference curves of the EPP group and the core countries through the 
policy  Pep'  In particular, it consists of the dark shaded area. Suppose the 
Commission President's ideal  policy  is  equal  to  the  core  countries'  ideal 
policy. Then the Commission President successfully proposes as a logroll the 
policy lep  that belongs to the set Lep  and is closest to his ideal policy. 
20 4.3 Logrolling under Codecision 
Under codecision the countries and MEPs can amend the proposed logroll. 
The final two stages of the logrolling process, as illustrated in Figure 2, are as 
under cooperation, however: the countries and MEPs vote on the (amended) 
logroll. The (amended) logroll is then adopted in the last two stages of the 
process if a qualified majority in the Council and a majority of MEPs prefer it 
to the policy P cd • 
Proposing a logroll or an amendment that is not preferred to the policy P  cd  by 
a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council is thus equivalent 
to proposing the policy  P cd' In equilibrium, the Commission President thus 
proposes a logroll that is (weakly) preferred to the policy Pcd by a majority of 
MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. Likewise, the Council President 
proposes an amendment that is  (weakly)  preferred to the policy  Pcd  by a 
majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. 
Suppose that the Council President proposes an amendment in the third stage 
of the logrolling process, and that a qualified majority in the Council and a 
majority of MEPs  do indeed prefer the logroll and the amendment to  the 
policy P cd' When voting on the amendment in the fifth and sixth stages of the 
logrolling process, the countries and MEPs then compare the amendment to 
the 10gro11.  The amendment is  then approved if a  majority of MEPs and a 
qualified  majority  in  the  Council  prefer  it  to  the  logroll.  Likewise,  the 
Parliament President agrees  to  the  amendment in the fourth stage of the 
logrolling  process,  if  he  prefers  it  to  the logrol!.  The  amendment is  thus 
successful if a qualified majority in the Council, a majority of MEPs, and the 
Parliament President prefer it to the logroll. 
21 In equilibrium, the Council President thus proposes an amendment that is (1) 
preferred to the policy  P cd  by a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in 
the Council, and (2)  preferred to the logroll by a  qualified majority in the 
Council, a majority of MEPs, and the Parliament President. In particular, he 
proposes as an amendment the policy he prefers most among the policies that 
satisfy the two conditions. Let a  cd (l cd)  be this amendment. It is a function of 
the logroll I  cd  proposed by the Commission President. 
Commissioners  voting on the  logroll  in the  second  stage  of  the  process 
compare the amendment  acA1cd)  that is  implemented if  they approve the 
logroll to the amendment  acd (p  cd)  that is  implemented they reject it.  The 
Commissioners vote in favor  of the logroll if they prefer the amendment 
acA1cd)  to the amendment  acd(pcd)'  The logroll is  thus approved in the 
second stage of the logrolling process  if  a  majority of the Commissioners 
prefer the amendment acd(lcd)  to the amendment acApcd)' 
Proposing a  logroll such that a  majority of the Commissioners prefers the 
amendment  a cAp  cd)  to  the  amendment  a  cd (l  cd)  is  thus  equivalent  to 
proposing the policy  P cd'  In equilibrium,  the Commission President thus 
proposes a logroll such that a majority of the Commissioners (weakly) prefers 
the amendment a  cd (l  cd)  to the amendment a cAp  cd) . 
Proposition 6 characterizes the set Lcd  of successful policies during logrolling 
and the equilibrium logroll under codecision. 
Proposition 6 The set  Lcd  of  successful policies during logrolling under code cis ion is 
the  set  of policies  acd (lcd)  that  satisfy  the  following  four  requirements.  First,  a 
qualified majority in the Council and a majority of  MEPs prefer each policy  acd (lcd) 
to  the  policy  P  cd'  Second,  a qualified majority in  the  Council,  a majority of  MEPs, 
22 and  the  Parliament  President  prefer  each  policy  acAlcd )  to  a logroll  lCd'  that  is 
preferred  to  the  policy  P  cd  by a majority of lvfEPs  and a qualified  majority in  the 
Council.  Third,  the  policy  a  cd (I cd)  is  the  policy the  Council  President prefers  most 
among  the  policies  that  satisfy  the  first  two  conditions  for  a logroll  I  cd /  that  is 
preferred  to  the  policy  P  cd  by a majority of MEPs  and a qualified  majority in  the 
Council.  Fourth,  the policy  a  cd (led)  is preferred to the policy  a  cd (p  cd)  by a majority 
of  the Commissioners.  The amendment  acd (p  cd)  is the amendment that is adopted if 
the  Commission  President  proposes  the  policy  P  cd  as  a logroll.  The  Commission 
President proposes as a logroll  the policy  Icd/  that is preferred to  the policy  Pcd  by a 
majority  of MEPs  and  a  qualified  majority  in  the  Council,  and  such  that  the 
amendment acd (lcd)  belongs to the set  Lcd  and is closest to his ideal policy. 
In Figure 6 logrolls that are preferred to the status quo by a majority of MEPs 
and a  qualified majority in the Council belong to the set  Lcp '  as explained 
above.  Not all logrolls in the set  Lcp  belong to  the set  Lcd/  however. The 
logroll  needs  to  be  such that the amendment  acAlcd )  is  preferred to  the 
amendment  acd(pcd)  by a majority of the Commissioners. The amendment 
a  cd (p  cd)  is the policy the Council President prefers most among the policies 
that are preferred to the policy  Pcd  by the Parliament President, a qualified 
majority in the Council and a majority of the MEPs. Suppose the Parliament 
President's ideal policy is  equal to  the EPP's ideal policy and the Council 
President's  ideal  policy  is  equal  to  the  core  countries'  ideal  policy.  The 
amendment  acApcd)  is  then the policy the Council President prefers most 
among the policies that belongs to the set Lcp' i.e., the policy I  cp'  Suppose all 
countries nominate Commissioners with ideal  policies  equal to  their own. 
Then no policy in the set Lcp  is strictly preferred to the policy  Icp  by a majority 
of the Commissioners, because the ten Commissioners of the UK and the core 
23 countries prefer the policy I  ep  to any other policy in the set Lep· As a result the 
set Lcd  is equal to the singleton {a cAp  cd)} . 
In  equilibrium  the  Commission  President  thus  proposes  the  policy 
led =  aeAPed)  as  a  logroll  in Figure  6.  A  majority  of  the  Commissioners 
approves  it,  since  the  Council  President  successfully  proposes  the  policy 
aed(Ped)  as an amendment otherwise. The Council President does not propose 
an amendment,  as  the  EPP  and  the  core  countries  cannot  agree  on an 
amendment. Finally, a qualified majority in the Council and a majority of the 
MEPs approve the logroll, because they prefer it  to the policy P cd. The logroll 
I  cd  is thus adopted. 
5 The Commission Appointment Process 
In this section I  study the Commission appointment process, as shown in 
Figure 1. Again, I consider three scenarios. In the first scenario the logrolling 
and policy making that follow  the Commission appointment occur under 
consultation. In the second scenario the cooperation procedure applies, and in 
the third scenario the codecision procedure is used. 
5.1 Commission Appointment under Consultation 
In the final two stages of the Commission appointment process the countries 
and MEPs vote on the proposed Commission. They compare the status quo to 
the policy  that will  be implemented if  the Commission is  appointed. The 
countries and MEPs consider the median Commissioners on all dimensions, 
the set CS  of successful proposals, the policy  Pes  that is implemented in the 
absence of logrolling, the set Les  of successfullogrolls, and the logroll les  that 
is  implemented.  They vote in favor of the Commission if  they prefer the 
24 logrolllcs to the status quo. The Commission is thus appointed if all countries 
and a rllajority of MEPs prefer the logroil I  cs  to the status quo. 
In Figure 7 the dashed line shows the set U of policies that are preferred to the 
status quo by all countries and a  majority of MEPs.  It is  bounded by the 
indifference curves through the status quo of the United Kingdom, the core 
countries, the EPP, the PES and the southern countries. The Commission is 
thus  appointed  if  the  logroll  I  cs  belongs  to  the  set  U.  Suppose  that the 
countries appoint Commissioners with ideal policies equal to their own ideal 
policies, as above. Then the logroll  I  cs  does indeed belong to the set U.· Such a 
Commission is  thus appointed in the  last two stages  of the  Commission 
appointment process. 
-----Figure 7 about here-----
In the  third  stage of the  Commission appointment process  the  countries 
nominate Commissioners. In equilibrium they nominate Commissioners such 
that the resulting logroll I  cs  belongs to the set U and is closest to their ideal 
policies,  if  this  is  possible  given  the  Commissioners  the  other  countries 
nominate.IS The choice of a Commissioner may affect the implemented policy 
in two ways. First, it may affect the median Commissioner on one or more 
dimensions, and thus the policy  Pes  that is  implemented in the absence of 
logrolling.  As  logrolls  are  compared  to  the  policy  Pes  in  the  logrolling 
process, the choice may thus affect the set of successful logrolls. Second, the 
choice may also affect this set because successfullogrolls need to be approved 
by a simple majority of the Commissioners. Similar arguments hold for the 
nomination  of  the  Commission  President  in  the  second  stage  of  the 
Commission appointment process. 
25 Proposition 7 characterizes the countries' optimal nomination strategies, and 
the  countries'  and  MEPs'  optimal  voting  strategies  in  the  Commission 
appointment process. 
Proposition 7 In the Commission appointment process the countries and MEPs vote 
in favor of  the Commission if they prefer the resulting logroll  I  cs  to the status quo. A 
Commission  is  thus  appointed  if the  resulting  logroll  I  es  belongs  to  the  set  U of 
policies  that  all  countries  and  a majority of MEPs  prefer  to  the  status  quo.  The 
countries nominate Commissioners such that the logroll  I  es  belongs  to  the set U and 
is closest to their ideal policies, if  this is possible given the other countries' nomination 
strategies. 
In  Figure  7  it  is  an  equilibrium  strategy  for  all  countries  to  nominate 
Commissioners with ideal policies equal to their own. The policies that are 
preferred to the policy Pes  by a qualified majority in the Council, are then also 
preferred to it by 15 Commissioners. So, a single country cannot affect the set 
Les' without changing the policy  Pes'  Given the other countries' nomination 
strategies  only  the  UK  and  the  core  countries  can  change  the  median 
Commissioner on a dimension by nominating a different Commissioner. In 
particular, they can give the median Commissioner a higher ideal policy on 
cohesion.  This  would move the policy  Pes  upward, and would move the 
corresponding  logroll  farther  away  from  the  ideal  policies  of  the  core 
countries  and  the  UK.  So,  the  countries  have  no  incentives  to  nominate 
Commissioners with ideal policies  different from their own ideal policies, 
given  that  the  other  countries  also  nominate  Commissioners  with  ideal 
policies equal to their own ideal policies. 
26 5.2 Commission Appointment under Cooperation 
In the second scenario, studied in this subsection, the cooperation procedure 
applies  to  the logrolling  and  policy  making that follow  the  Commission 
appointment. The Commission appointment process is as under consultation. 
As a result, the conclusions are analogous. 
In the final two stages of the Commission appointment process the countries 
and MEPs vote on the proposed Commission. It is appointed if the resulting 
logroll lcp  belongs to the set U of policies that all countries and a majority of 
MEPs prefer to the status quo. In Figure 7 the logrolllcp does indeed belong to 
the set U,  if all countries appoint Commissioners with ideal policies equal to 
their own ideal policies. 
In the  third  stage  of  the  Commission appointment process  the  countries 
nominate Commissioners. In equilibrium they nominate Commissioners such 
that the resulting logroll  lcp  belongs to the set U and is closest to their ideal 
policies,  if this  is  possible  given  the  Commissioners  the  other  countries 
nominate. The optimal voting and nominating strategies under cooperation 
are thus similar to the optimal strategies under consultation. In Figure 7 it is 
optimal for all countries to nominate Commissioners with ideal policies equal 
to their own ideal policies. 
5.3 Commission Appointment under Codecision 
In the third scenario the codecision procedure applies to the logrolling and 
policy making that follow  the Commission appointment. The  Commission 
appointment process is as above. So, the conclusions are analogous. 
27 In the final two stages of the Commission appointment process the countries 
and MEPs vote on the proposed Commission. It is appointed if the resulting 
policy a  cd (l  cd)  belongs to the set U of policies that all countries and a majority 
of MEPs prefer to the status quo. In Figure 7 the logroll  lcd  = acAlcd)  does 
indeed belong to the set U,  if all countries appoint Commissioners with ideal 
policies equal to their own ideal policies. 
In the  third stage  of the Commission appointment process  the  countries 
nominate Commissioners. In equilibrium they nominate Commissioners such 
that the resulting policy  acd(lcd)  belongs to the set U and is closest to their 
ideal policies, if this is possible given the Commissioners the other countries 
nominate. The optimal voting and nominating strategies under cooperation 
are thus similar to the optimal strategies under consultation. In Figure 7 it is 
optimal for all countries to nominate Commissioners with ideal policies equal 
to their own ideal policies. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper presents spatial theories of Commission appointment, logrolling, 
and policy making in the EU. It characterizes sets of successful policies during 
logrolling and policy making, i.e. policies that can become EU policy during 
the logrolling and policy making processes. It considers the three principal ED 
legislative procedures: consultation, cooperation and codecision. 
During policy making a policy is successful under consultation if a qualified 
majority in the Council prefers it to the status quo on each dimension. Under 
cooperation a majority of MEPs also needs to prefer the policy to the status 
quo on each dimension. Under codecision there is  a third requirement that 
there be no policies a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council 
28 prefer to  the policy.  The Commission successfully  proposes the  policies  it 
prefers most among the policies that satisfy these requirements. 
During logrolling  a  policy  is  successful  under consultation  if  a  qualified 
majority in the Council and a majority of the Commissioners prefer it to the 
policy the Commission successfully proposes during policy making. Under 
cooperation a majority of MEPs also needs to prefer the policy to the policy 
the  Commission  successfully  proposes  during  policy  making.  Under 
codecision a policy is successful if it satisfies the following four requirements. 
First, a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council prefer it to 
the  policy  the  Commission  successfully  proposes  during  policy  making. 
Second,  a  majority of MEPs,  a  qualified majority in the  Council  and the 
Parliament President prefer it to the logroll.  Third, the Council President 
prefers  the  policy  most  among  the  policies  that  satisfy  the  first  two 
requirements. Fourth, a majority of the Commissioners prefers the policy to 
the  amendment the Council President would propose if  they rejected  the 
logroll. The Commission President successfully proposes the policies it prefers 
most among the policies that satisfy these requirements. 
During the Commission appointment process a Commission is appointed if 
all countries and a majority of MEPs prefer the resulting logroll to the status 
quo. The countries nominate Co  missioners who bring EU policy closest to 
their ideal policies. 
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throughout this paper. 
S In reality, the Commission President needs the approval of all countries and a majority of 
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procedures. It seems logical that a  logroll across  issues that are to  be dealt with under a 
certain procedure would indeed need to be approved under the same procedure. In addition, 
I  assume that the Commission President proposes a  logroll within the Commission. This 
32 seems reasonable given the Commission President's prominent role in the Commission and 
the inherently multi-issue character of logrolls. 
10 An amendment is worked out in the Conciliation Committee and then voted on in the 
Council and the Parliament. The Conciliation Committee consists of the members of the 
Council and an equal number of representatives of the Parliament. The Council and 
Parliament Presidents (or their representatives) take turns at chairing the Committee's 
meetings. Both Presidents also convene prior to the Committee's meetings to agree on a 
compromise. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the Presidents present an 
amendment they agree on to the Council and the Parliament. In the model I assume that the 
Council President proposes the amendment. This assumption does not affect the conclusions. 
See Corbett et al. (1995) on the functioning of the Conciliation Committee. 
11  France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain 8;  Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands 5 each; Austria and Sweden 4 each; Denmark, Finland 
and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2. 
12 In other words Black's median voter theorem applies (Black 1958). 
13 In reality, a Conciliation Committee consisting of representatives of the Parliament and the 
countries can negotiate a joint text. The treaties provide for a reversion policy in case of a 
disagreement in the Conciliation Committee. As a result, the assumption that the Parliament 
proposes the joint text does not affect the equilibrium EU policy. In equilibrium the 
Commission determines the reversion policy by making a proposal that cannot be amended in 
the Conciliation Committee. 
14 In reality the countries and the MEPs do not know exactly what issues they will be dealing 
with over a period of five years. It  seems reasonable to assume, however, that they have a 
good idea of the main issues that will arise, and that they have these issues in mind when 
appointing a Commission. 
15 As seen above, the ideal i-policy of the i-median Commissioner (MEP) can be thought of as 
the Commission's (Parliament's) ideal i-policy. 
16 On dimension i the Commission's (Parliament's) ideal policy consists of  t.~e i-median 
Commissioner (MEP) ideal i- policy. 
17 Currently the PES group consists of 214 members, whereas the EPP group has 200 members 
in the 626 member Parliament. 
18 If  a country cannot nominate Commissioners such that the resulting logroll belongs to the 
set U, given the other countries' nomination strategies, then its nomination strategy is 
irrelevant, because the Commission will not be appointed. 
33 Nature selects the country 
k that is to propose a 
Commission President. 
j 
Figure 1:  Commission Appointment. 



























Figure 2: Logrolling. 
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2 Figure 3: The Legislative Procedures. 
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Policies. 
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